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It is now widely accepted that ‘transparency’ in the conduct of monetary policy improves policy 
outcomes.
1 The reasons for this have been widely explored (see e.g. Chortareas, et al, 2003) and it is 
clear that the range of benefits is partly due to the range of meanings which can be given to the term 
(Geraats, 2000). For the purposes of this paper, the evidence of transparency with which we are 
concerned (a) defines a transparent policy as one where agents can anticipate CB decisions and 
thus (b) sees the advantage primarily in preventing policy decisions themselves being a source 
of destabilising shocks to the economy. This is essentially the position taken by the Bank of 
England and lay behind Mervyn King’s (1997) famous remark that the hallmark of a well-
conducted monetary policy is that it should be ‘boring’. The ‘news’ should be in the behaviour 
of macroeconomic variables and not in the central bank’s subsequent reaction to them.  Notice 
that this amounts to an ambition whereby agents will know the (a) the structure of the central 
bank’s reaction function, (b) the size of the coefficients, (c) the value of the macro-variables to 
which these coefficients apply and therefore (d) the way in which those macro-variables are 
likely to be influenced by any change in the official rate of interest. 
  The first publication to confirm the importance placed by central banks on the 
transparency of their actions was the study by Fry et al. (2000) which showed that some 74 per 
cent of banks claimed to promote the openness of their policy making. Since then, there have 
been numerous studies which attempt to measure the actual (or perceived) transparency of 
individual regimes. Such studies fall into three broad categories. Firstly, there are those which, 
following the central bank independence literature of some fifteen years ago, rank central banks 
according to their demonstration of institutional characteristics deemed a priori to contribute to 
                                                
1 But see Thornton (2003) for some critical observations.   3 
transparency (for example, Fry et al, 2000; Eijffinger and Geraats, 2002; De Haan and 
Amtenbrink, 2002). Secondly, there are surveys of market opinion (for example, Goldman 
Sachs (2000), Waller and De Haan (2004) and Reuters (recurrently)). Thirdly, there are tests of 
practitioners’ ability to anticipate the decision of the policymaker. These focus upon movements 
in short-term money market rates surrounding the date of an interest rate decision and we turn to 
these in a moment. 
  What is apparent from the ‘characteristics’ and the survey evidence is that the ECB does 
not rank consistently highly, in spite of its constitution being drawn up in a period when 
transparency was at least beginning to become fashionable. Also apparent, but less surprising, is 
that its predecessor, the Deutsche Bundesbank generally ranks low in the league tables.  The 
position of the ECB in these rankings tends if anything to confirm the allegations made by 
Buiter in the famous Buiter-Issing (1999) debate that the absence of an inflation report and 
minutes or voting records of meetings was unhelpful to agents. 
  What is even more surprising than the moderate ranking of the ECB is the fact that both 
the ECB and the Bundesbank score highly in the third group of studies, based on what we shall 
call market-evidence. Relevant studies here include Bernhardsen and Kloster (2002); Coppell 
and Connolly (2003); Haldane and Read (2000); Hardy (1998); Perez-Quiros and Sicilia  (2002)  
Ross (2002) and Wadhwani (2001). These are invariably comparative studies and (although 
countries in the comparisons vary) what generally emerges is that money market practitioners 
find it no more difficult to anticipate the interest rate decisions of the Bundesbank or later the 
ECB than they do, say, the actions of the Bank of England or the Federal Reserve. Writing in the 
Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin in 2001, Wadwhani reported that ‘The results of this 
exercise [covering the period 1997-2001] suggest that the average market ‘surprise’ on the day 
of an interest rate decision has been higher in the UK compared with the United States and 
Europe’ (Wadwhani, 2001, p.355). Coppell and Connolly (2003) looked at market anticipation 
in Australia and compared it with other regimes including the USA, UK, Canada and Germany. 
The data covered the period 1996 to 2002 (and thus for Germany covered a period of both 
Bundesbank and ECB policy-making). They found ‘…it [was] not possible to reject the 
hypothesis that the level of anticipation by the markets of a rate move in each country [was] 
equal’. 
  It is perhaps not altogether surprising that the results from the ‘characteristics’ approach 
and from market interest rates should differ. Listing rather arbitrary characteristics and attaching 
(even more) arbitrary weights to them received a critical press at the time of the independence 
investigations and the results deserve to be treated with caution. What is more remarkable is that   4 
the practitioners whose actions in money markets appear to confirm that they can ‘read’ the 
ECB and (could read the) Bundesbank tolerably well, are substantially the same agents who 
report themselves as uncertain or confused by the ECB and Bundesbank behaviour in the 
surveys. In this paper we try to shed some light on this apparent paradox. 
  We do this by making use of additional information provided in cross sectional data, 
which allow us to examine the dispersion of views amongst agents when they predict future 
relevant variables.
2 As Haldane and Read (2000) and other authors have shown (and we show 
for the ECB), on average agents anticipate Bank of England policy no better than Bundesbank 
or ECB policy. However, transparency should not only reduce the size of average policy 
surprises, but greater benefits from transparency should also be apparent in a narrowing of the 
diversity in cross sectional forecasts. This paper is concerned with answering the following 
questions: (i) Has the spread of market rate forecasts changed over time and does it vary under 
different regimes? If transparency reduces uncertainty, then we would expect a greater decline 
in the dispersion of forecasts under the Bank of England than under the ECB regime. (ii) Has the 
forecast spread of key macro variables changed in Germany and the UK and if so has it changed 
in different directions? The dispersion across forecasts may have changed because the economy 
is more stable and thus easier to forecast. For example, since macroeconomic forecasts enter the 
reaction function of the central bank, an increased convergence of view about the future path of 
interest rates may be due more to greater certainty about future economic developments than to 
greater transparency. (iii) Is the change in forecast diversity an important variable in explaining 
the dispersion of forecasts regarding money market developments? 
  Since our starting point in this study is the observation that agents behaviour in money 
markets is at odds with their reported perceptions in surveys and with what one might expect 
from regime characteristics, it seems appropriate bring the market evidence up to date, in section 
2, using the Haldane and Read (2000) model referred to above. We shall see that this confirms 
that nothing much has changed in UK and German money markets since their investigation. 
Agents are still able to ‘read’ German money markets pretty well.  
In section 3, we test the hypothesis that while agents anticipations in aggregate may be 
broadly correct, underlying this ‘average’ outcome there may have been an increasing dispersion  
of individual views about the next movement in interest rates. In section 4 we look at why this 
might be the case, by looking at agents’ views about the two key variables in the central bank’s 
                                                
2 The only other study we are aware of which also uses cross-sectional data to analyse the potential benefits of 
transparency is Swanson (2004) for the USA.   5 
reaction function, namely the rate of inflation and the trend in output. In section 5 we summarize 
and conclude. 
 
2. Updating the market evidence 
For Germany and the UK we have daily data on money market rates over various maturities. For 
the UK, the sample period is from January 1984 until mid-October 2003. The market interest 
rates are the yields on Certificates of Deposits with a maturity of 1, 3, 6, and 12 months. This 
gave us about 5000 observations on each maturity. During this period, the Bank of England 
changed the official rate exactly 100 times. The sample period for Germany stretches from 
January 1989 until 21
st July 2004. Market interest rates are the daily rates in Frankfurt for 1, 3, 
6, and 12 months. During this period, the Bundesbank changed the discount rate 22 times and 
the ECB changed the policy rate 15 times. 
Banks lend to each other on money markets and they will not borrow from each other at 
rates that differ greatly from that of the central bank. Furthermore, money markets are 
‘wholesale’ markets dominated by very large trades carried out by very well-informed 
professionals seeking to exploit the smallest interest rate differentials. Consequently, money 
market interest rates should reflect the actual and expected path of the official rate. If money 
market participants expect the central bank to change the official rate, short-term money market 
rates will incorporate agents’ expectations over the future policy rate. To the extent that agents 
guess correctly, money market rates will change before the change in the official rate occurs in 
order to avoid capital loss. We refer to this as anticipation of monetary policy. 
How do agents form expectations of future official rates?  If the official rate is set 
according to a monetary policy rule, a Taylor-type rule, for example, then, provided that the 
central bank published the rule, agents would have a relatively simple task. However, central 
banks have always denied that they operate such a rule, at least in a mechanical way, while not 
denying that the size of the output gap and the divergence of current inflation from target are 
important inputs to their decisions. (e.g. Bank of England, 2001 p.i) After all, if monetary policy 
decisions were simple rule-driven, one would not require a Monetary Policy Committee and 
several days of deliberation to make them (see Bean and Jenkinson, 2001) 
However, because policy decisions are to some degree discretionary, agents do not have 
perfect knowledge of future Central Bank policy. Depending on the amount of policy 
transparency, some degree of surprise will remain and the yield curve will jump on the day of 
announcement, where the size of the jump depends (negatively) on the extent of policy 
transparency.    6 
To extract some measure of policy surprise along the yield curve, we estimate the change 
in market interest rates for both countries as follows (Haldane and Read, 2000): 
( ) , , ( ) 1 t j j j t j j t j t t mar c L mar pol D pol e b l d D = + D + D + D +  
The subscript j stands for the term to maturity. The variable mar indicates the market rate, pol 
stands for the official rate and D is an impulse dummy.  
For the UK, D takes the value 1 from November 1992 onwards and is zero otherwise. It 
is used to capture the effect of the introduction of inflation targeting in the UK. With inflation 
targeting, the Bank of England began to inform the public about its monetary policy decision 
process. In addition to the setting of a quantitative target for inflation, early examples of 
institutional reforms included the regular scheduling of meetings between the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer and the Governor of the Bank, the publication of minutes of their meetings and the 
quarterly Inflation Report. Later developments included the release of minutes and voting 
records of MPC meetings. Some of the examples are the publication of the inflation report, the 
regular MPC meetings and their reports, the publication of the voting behaviour etc.  
For Germany, the dummy variable has the value 1 from January 1999 onwards and zero 
otherwise, in order to capture the potential effect of the regime shift from the Bundesbank to the 
ECB.    
Lags of the dependent variable were included in equations for the UK and Germany, to 
reduce serial correlation. The coefficient ￿ measures the average interest rate surprise over the 
full sample. If ￿=0, the market rate does not change in response to the change in the official rate 
and policy was fully anticipated before the central bank changed the official rate. In other words, 
a central bank interest rate change itself is no news. Only unexpected changes in 
macroeconomic variables would make the yield curve jump. Similarly, if ￿=1, market agents are 
completely taken by surprise by central bank actions with all adjustment taking place on the day 
of the interest rate announcement. 
For Germany, the coefficient ￿ measures the average change in market rates due to the 
regime shift from Bundesbank to ECB. If ￿=0, then there is no change in interest rate surprises 
due to the regime shift. If, as (some of) the financial press has suggested on various occasions, 
changes in the ECB policy rate are hard to anticipate, then the sign of the coefficient ￿ should be 
positive. The sum of the coefficients ￿ and ￿ measures the size of the average interest rate 
surprise along the yield curve during the later period of ECB policy.   7 
For the UK, ￿ measures the distinct effect of inflation targeting and the accompanying 
changes in public information of the decision making process on expected market interest rates.
3 
If ￿=0, then there is no shift in interest rate surprises due to the more transparent regime that has 
accompanied inflation targeting. We expect a negative sign for ￿ if inflation targeting made it 
easier for agents to anticipate Bank of England monetary policy. The sum of the coefficients ￿ 
and ￿ measures the size of the average interest rate surprise during the later period of greater 
central bank transparency. 




Table 1: Comparison of policy surprise in short-term interest rates in Germany and UK 
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The model was estimated with OLS. The t-values in brackets in Table 1 are calculated on the basis of 
Newey-West adjusted standard errors to ensure consistency.  
 
Turning first to the results for the UK, we note the policy surprise coefficient ￿ is 
significant throughout the yield curve. Taking the sample period as a whole, between about 43 
and 13 per cent of a policy rate change comes as a surprise on the day of the announcement. 
Throughout most of the maturity spectrum, the adjustment on the day is above 25 percent. 
Interestingly, the coefficient of the dummy variable is significant (except for the 3-month rate) 
and negative. This suggests that the movement to inflation targeting and the associated reforms 
in 1992, have made it easier  for agents to anticipate Bank of England monetary policy. In the 
later period, only between 8 and 13 percent (= ￿ + ￿) of the official rate change has to be 
corrected on the day of announcement.  
                                                
3 Earlier attempts to capture individual factors like publication of inflation report, MPC report etc. were not very 
successful in finding significant individual effects. This may be so because by the time this information is 
published, it s not anymore news (see eg Chadha and Nolan, 2001)  
4 The complete estimations may be obtained from the authors on request.   8 
For Germany, policy surprise is substantially lower varying between 6 and 9 per cent 
over the whole sample period. The coefficient on the dummy variable is positive but it is always 
insignificant. Crucially, therefore, we do not find statistical evidence for the hypothesis that 
ECB interest rate decisions contain a greater surprise element than the former Bundesbank’s. 
Furthermore, even during the ECB monetary policy regime, on average, agents anticipate 
changes in the official rate at least as well as they do under the Bank of England as other studies, 
listed in section 1, have found.
5 
 
3. Money market rate uncertainty 
We have just seen that on average, agents’ ability to anticipate central bank monetary policy has 
been high for both: Germany throughout the sample period and for the UK since 1992. Here, we 
extend the test for monetary policy anticipation by considering the dispersion of view.  Our 
thinking here is that while, on average (or in the aggregate), agents’ anticipation may not have 
changed, or even may have improved, it is perfectly possible for this to be accompanied at the 
same time by increasing uncertainty on the part of individual agents. What the results may be 
telling us about average behaviour, may be concealing a change in the degree of unanimity 
across agents.  A greater dispersion of view would in turn indicate greater insecurity vis-à-vis 
monetary policy which would not show up in the estimations of the previous section. In the case 
of Germany, it may also shed some light on the difference between results from money markets 
which find policy anticipation high and the characteristics and survey evidence which find it 
low.         
In order to measure the degree of unanimity with which private agents anticipate interest 
rate changes by the central bank over time, we looked at the range and standard deviation of 
forecasts by private institutions as reported in Consensus Forecasts. Every month, this 
publication shows the forecasts for, inter alia, the 3-month euro-DM interest rate (i.e. the rate on 
3-month deposits in euros in Germany) and the 3-month interbank rate for the UK for some 25 
private sector institutions (although this number of institutions reporting forecasts varies 
somewhat during the year). The forecasts are in both cases for 3 and 12 months ahead. We use 
two measures of volatility: the standard deviation of the forecasts of the private agents as 
reported in Consensus Forecasts, and we calculated the range for the third highest and third 
lowest forecasts (which is about the 12
th and 88
th percentile of the distribution) and compared 
them over time. Any changes in the cross-sectional distribution of forecasts are interpreted as a 
change in the unanimity with which individual private agents forecast central bank policy. The 
                                                
5 see the studies listed in section 1.   9 
sample period is from January 1994 until May 2004.
6 The aim of this section is to find out how 
the distribution of forecast views has changed over time. Thus we estimate for both countries the 
trend behaviour of this variation by the following equation: 
2
, , ( ) (2) t i i i t i i i t Dispersion L dispersion Trend Trend e a b t j = + + + +  
The dependent variable dispersion stands for the forecast range or the forecast standard 
deviation and the subscript i distinguishes between the quarterly and one-year ahead forecasts. 
Thus, the range of views about future interest rate developments is measured four ways: (1) by 
the 3-month-ahead and (2) the 1-year ahead forecasting range of the short-term money market 
rate, denoted by 3mRange and annualRange, respectively, as well as by (3) the 3-month-ahead 
forecast standard deviation (3mSD) and (4) the 1-year-ahead forecast standard deviation 
(annualSD). The lagged dependent variable was included to reduce serial correlation.  
  Equation (2) models a non-linear relationship of forecast dispersions across time. This 
curve linear trend model allows a levelling off or accelerating of the change in unanimity over 
time. If agents find it easier (harder) over time to forecast, forecasting uncertainty declines 
(increases) over time and we expect a negative (positive) coefficient ( i t ) on the trend variable in 
both equations. Forecasting uncertainty in (2) may show (a) a decelerating positive slope 
( 0, 0 i i t j > < ), (b) an accelerating positive slope ( 0, 0 i i t j > > ), (c) a decelerating negative 
slope ( 0, 0 i i t j < > ), or an accelerating negative slope ( 0, 0 i i t j < < ).  
  We turn to the empirical results and begin with those for Germany first (see Table 2 
below)
7. The estimation results of the previous section showed that on average, monetary policy 
anticipation has not changed over the sample period, despite the regime shift to the ECB. Thus, 
an interesting hypothesis to test for Germany is whether agents may have become more 
uncertain about their monetary policy predictions in the later (sample) period. If the hypothesis 
were correct that ECB policy has increased agents’ forecasting uncertainty, we would expect the 
following estimation results of equation (2): Either, if ￿ were negative over the entire sample 
period, implying that over time agents have become more confident in forecasting monetary 
policy, then ￿ should be positive so that the falling trend flattens out as time goes on (‘getting 
better but more slowly’); or, if ￿ were positive over the sample period, then ￿ should also be 
positive, indicating an accelerating rise in private agents’ forecasting uncertainty (‘getting worse 
and more quickly’). 
                                                
6 Due to the lack of data, we cannot distinguish between pre- and post inflation targeting for the UK. We tried to 
test for a break in anticipation due to Bank of England independence. However, we could not find a significant 
break 
7 All estimations that involve model (2) use orthogonal trends in order to avoid correlation between the explanatory 





Table 2: Quarterly and annual forecasting volatility of the money market rates for 
Germany and the UK, based on equation (2)  
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Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of 
Newy-West adjusted variances and covariances. LM(2) is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial 
correlation of order 2.  In square brackets in the last column are the probability levels ‘*’ indicate that 
coefficients or tests are significant at the 5% level of less. 
 
Turning to the results of 3-month ahead forecast (3mRange(G)and 3mSD(G)) for 
Germany first, we find that none of the trend variables explains the dependent variables. The 
results are slightly different for 1-year-ahead forecast uncertainty, where the squared trend 
variable is significantly positive (albeit just so for annualRange(G)). On the basis of these 
estimations it is not obvious that there is convincing evidence of a significant relationship 
between time and forecast uncertainty.    11 
We continued to estimate an additional equation for Germany. This regression considers 
directly the effect of the regime shift in 1999 and is of the following form: 
 
, , ( ) 99 99 (3) t i i i t i i i i t Dispersion L Dispersion D Trend D Trend e a b g t d = + + + + +   
 
The dummy variable D99 has, as before, the value 1 from January 1999 onwards and is zero 
otherwise. The coefficient ￿ measures the shift in the degree of uncertainty since 1999. If ￿ = 0, 
then the level of uncertainty has not changed since the regime change to ECB monetary policy. 
A positive coefficient ￿ indicates an increase in the average forecasting volatility of private 
agents. The coefficient ￿ measures the development of agents’ uncertainty over time over the 
entire sample period. A negative ￿-coefficient indicates over time increasing forecasting 
consensus of the private institutions reported in Consensus Forecasts.  The coefficient ￿ 
measures the distinct change in the degree of uncertainty over time since the institutional 
change. The sum of the coefficients ￿ and ￿ measures the degree of agents’ uncertainty over time 
during ECB policy. Again, lagged dependent variables were included so as to reduce serial 
correlation.  
 
Table 3: Quarterly and annual forecasting volatility of the 3-month euro-DM rates based 
on (3)  
Variable 
i a   i b   i g   i t   i d  
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Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of 
Newy-West adjusted variances and covariances. LM(2) is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial 
correlation of order 2.  In square brackets are the probability levels ‘*’ indicate that coefficients and tests 
are significant at the 5% level of less. 
   12 
We find that between 28% and 62% of the variation of average uncertainty is explained 
by the regressions. Three-month–ahead forecasting volatility is less well explained by variations 
over time than one-year-ahead uncertainty. Over the entire sample period, 3-month-ahead 
forecasting volatility falls over time (3mRange and 3mSD), a trend which is not reversed in the 
later period. Over the whole sample period, mean forecasting uncertainty declines by 0.0017 
(3mRange) and 0.001 (3mSD) percentage points per month. The shift dummy variables are 
insignificant in both cases, so that the average forecasting range and average level of the 
standard deviation have not altered since January 1999.   
Turning to 1-year-ahead forecasting uncertainty, annualRange and annualSD, 
uncertainty falls on average over the whole sample period. However, this trend has been 
reversed since 1999. Over the sample period, the average forecasting range (average standard 
deviation) declines by 0.006 (0.002) percentage points per month, but during the ECB regime, 
uncertainty over interest rates in Germany has been rising on average well above the decline 
over the entire sample period.  
Summarizing the results of table 3, both measures, forecasting range and standard 
deviation, suggest that uncertainty regarding the 3-month-ahead forecast of the euro-DM rate 
has been unchanged since the ECB took over monetary policy and has been falling throughout 
the entire sample period. However, the result is not so unambiguous for the one-year ahead 
forecasting range/standard deviation of the euro-DM interest rate. There we found that the 
downward trend has been reversed to an upward trend in uncertainty since ECB policy, but also, 
that there has been a strong downward shift in the average forecasting range and standard 
deviation. The results of the one-year ahead forecasting range indicate that ECB policy has 
increased agents’ uncertainty about the rate on 3-month German euro deposits at the one year 
horizon.  
Comparing the results of Tables 2 and 3, generally model (2) seems to describe forecast 
volatility less satisfactorily than model (3).
8 On the basis of the results of these two different 
models, we may deduce that outcomes on 3-month-ahead forecast uncertainty are inconclusive 
concerning the overall trend; however, both models come to the same results that there is no 
change in uncertainty during the ECB policy period. For 1-year-ahead forecast uncertainty, we 
find some indication in both models for both volatility measures that euro-DM forecasting 
uncertainty has risen, particularly later on in the sample period. 
                                                
8 The explanatory power is slightly lower, most trend coefficients are insignificant and in three out of four 
estimations the diagnostic test is significant.   13 
We turn now to the results for the UK and begin by returning to Table 2. Recall that the 
estimations of the previous section (2) showed that UK money markets have found it on average 
easier to anticipate monetary policy decisions since November 1992. Again, the aim of the 
estimations here is to test whether agents’ confidence with respect to forecasting money market 
rates has changed over time, since attempts to improve agents’ understanding of policy 
decisions have been to some extent incremental.
9  
The curve-linear trend model is a useful tool to test how the changes in the conduct of 
monetary policy have affected agents’ confidence over time. If the increase in transparency 
enhanced agents’ understanding and confidence, we would expect that uncertainty fell over time 
( 0, 0) i i t j = ￿ . Bean (2005 pp.86-88) for example, in commenting upon the greater economic 
stability with which policymakers have been confronted in recent years suggests that part of the 
explanation is an improvement in policymaking itself. This suggests a sort of virtuous circle 
whereby (we can begin anywhere) improved policymaking improves stability which makes it 
easier for agents to anticipate the path of macro-variables and the reaction of the authorities for 
whom policymaking then becomes easier. In addition to any achievements in policymaking, the 
passage of time is inevitably relevant since, for any given regime, time enables agents to learn 
by experience. Whadhwani (2001, p.355) suggests that agents’ required two years (1997-99) to 
‘learn’ about the reactions of the MPC.  And it is a general theme of Thornton (2003) that what 
really improves policy outcomes is the stability of regime combined with consistent behaviour. 
In these circumstances, time alone will ensure that agents understand how the monetary 
authority behaves, without any of the currently fashionable ‘transparency characteristics’.  If 
learning is important, it may even be that over time, agents’ uncertainty falls more rapidly 
( 0, 0) i i t j ￿ ￿ . 
The results in Table 2 show that between 26% and 75% of the variation in the volatility 
measures are explained by the non-linear trend model. Both measures (3mRange(UK) and 3m 
SD(UK)) indicate, as the literature generally implies, that 3-month-ahead forecast uncertainty 
has declined throughout the sample period. On average, uncertainty fell by 0.0015 
(3mRange(UK)) and 0.0004 (3mSD(UK)) percentage points per month. Similarly, one-year-
ahead forecasting uncertainty also has declined, but at a falling rate.  In fact, from mid-1996 
                                                
9 For example, while the march towards openness begins famously with inflation targeting and the publication of 
the Inflation Report in November 1992, 1994 saw the introduction of a regular schedule of meetings between the 
Chancellor and Governor and the publication of minutes of their meetings. May 1997 saw the Bank of England 
given operational independence and a shortening in the lag between decision meetings and the publication of 
minutes. Wadhwani (2001) argues that 1999 marks another significant date since by then agents have had sufficient 
time to ‘learn’ how the MPC works.   14 
onwards, the curve flattens out and uncertainty begins to rise again thereafter.
10 This outcome is 
not in line with the idea that greater Bank of England policy transparency increases markets’ 
understanding and implicitly reduces uncertainty. We think that the following section may shed 
some light on this result. 
 What is the difference between German and UK results so far? For both countries, there 
is evidence that forecasting uncertainty declines over time. The dispersion of 1-year-ahead 
forecasts initially declines, but this trend is reversed later on in both countries. As with average 
views (see section 2), so too with the dispersion of views a rather similar picture of monetary 
policy anticipation emerges for both countries. 
 
4. Explaining short-term interest rate uncertainty 
The change in uncertainty over forecasting market interest rates in both countries over time 
could have a number of possible explanations. However, if there is a consensus that deviations 
of current from target inflation and changes in the output gap are important inputs into central 
bank reaction functions,
11 then one obvious hypothesis that we must test is that agents have 
become more (or less) certain in their inflation and GDP forecasts too. Thinking in terms of a 
reaction function, the point here is that while agents may be reasonably knowledgeable about the 
magnitude of the coefficients, they may become more or less certain about the magnitudes to 
which the coefficients apply. In other words, even if the central bank reaction function is well 
understood and known, it is possible that agents find it difficult to forecast relevant 
macroeconomic variables. If this is the case, then even for given and ‘known’ coefficients in the 
reaction function, the forecasting uncertainty of money market rates varies with the forecasting 
uncertainty of, say, the inflation rate or the relationship of output to trend.
12 The uncertainty 
about future inflation (or economic growth), will then show up in a greater spread of the 
forecasts of money market rates.  
  Agents’ uncertainty about macroeconomic development may change either because the 
economy moves away from a more stable state, or there is a turn in the business cycle, or the 
economy experiences shocks, to give just a few examples. Also the establishment of new, major 
                                                
10 The point in time (t) of the ‘flattening out’ of the trend can be calculated as the first derivative with respect to 
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11 See Stuart (1996) for the UK. 
12 Mervyn King might be right that in an ideal policy world the ‘news’ would be in the movement of the 
macroeconomic variables but if that news is hard to extract, monetary policy could still have its exciting moments.   15 
institutions may initially cause greater uncertainty for agents until these institutions have been 
established for some years or so.
13 
The latter may be particularly relevant for the German estimations. EMU is a new 
phenomenon and in this section we want to analyse whether agents found it more difficult in 
these circumstances to predict macroeconomic variables as inflation and GDP growth.  
Particularly at the beginning of EMU, it may be more difficult for agents to predict the 
macroeconomy of individual countries in the new area given the uncertainty over the true degree 
of convergence of individual economies and how they would react to the ‘one-size-fits-all’ level 
of interest rates. Since the prediction of central bank policy moves depends to some extent on 
agents being able to forecast movements in the variables entering the bank’s reaction function, 
then increasing difficulty in forecasting these variables would make agents less confident in 
their anticipation of policy moves, especially since there is feedback to these variables from the 
authorities’ policy decisions and since because of the new regime the nature of the feedback has 
become uncertain. Furthermore, this injection of uncertainty into the way in which current 
interest rate decisions affect the future path of relevant macro variables will increase with the 
forecast horizon. Current interest rate decisions may have little effect on relevant magnitudes 
three months hence, but will very likely have some impact in a year’s time.  
In the following sections, we estimate agents’ uncertainty regarding inflation and GDP 
growth. Finally, we test whether inflation uncertainty explains uncertainty in market interest 
rates. 
For both countries, we use monthly data for inflation and real GDP growth, each 
predicted one year ahead (only). Again, we calculate the forecast range and use the reported 
standard deviation to measure macroeconomic forecast uncertainty. For the UK, the sample 
period is from January 1994 until May 2004. For Germany, the sample period for the one-year-
ahead inflation forecast range is from January 1994 until May 2004 and for the one-year-ahead 
GDP growth range it is from June 1994 until May 2004.  Forecasts for GDP growth refer to 
unified Germany throughout. Inflation forecasts are reported for West Germany until September 
1997, only. We use equations (2) and (3) above, replacing the dependent variable therein by the 
one-year-ahead inflation and one-year-ahead real GDP growth forecasting range or standard 
deviation, respectively.
14  The results of the estimations of equation (2) are shown in Table 4 
below: 
 
                                                
13 See again Wadhwani (2002, p.355) 
14 In the German case, we included a further dummy to account for a change in the reporting of the inflation data 
from West Germany to Germany. It was insignificant and is not reported here.   16 
 
 
Table 4: Quarterly and annual forecasting volatility of the inflation rate and GDP growth 
for Germany and the UK based on equation (2)  
Variable 
i a   i b   i t   i j  
2 R  
[
2 R ] 
LM(2) 
































































































Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of 
Newy-West adjusted variances and covariances. LM(2) is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial 
correlation of order 2.  In the last column in square brackets are the probability levels ‘*’ indicate that 
coefficients and tests are significant at the 5% level of less. 
 
We first turn to the results for Germany. The dispersion of GDP forecasts is not 
explained by the trend variables in the curve-linear trend model. A glance at Table 5 below also 
shows that there does not seem to be a systematic relationship between GDP forecast 
uncertainty and the trend model. However, the results are quite different for the variance of 
views about inflation.  The non-linear trend model provides clear evidence for a rise in inflation 
forecast uncertainty throughout the sample, with an accelerating positive slope. Rising inflation 
uncertainty is confirmed by the results presented in Table 5 where inflation uncertainty has been 
rising since January 1999.  
   17 
 
 
Table 5: Annual forecasting range and standard deviation of the inflation rate and GDP 
growth for Germany based on equation 3. 
Variable 
i a   i b   i g   i t   i d  
2 R  
[
2 R ] 
LM(2) 










0.52  5.84 
[0.054] 










0.52  4.47 
[0.107] 










0.22  0.085 
[0.959] 










0.31  0.534 
[0.766] 
Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of 
Newy-West adjusted variances and covariances. LM(2) is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial 
correlation of order 2.  In square brackets are the probability levels ‘*’ indicate that coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level of less. 
 
The results for the UK, as presented in Table 4, show the following: contrary to the German 
results, GDP forecast volatility changes over time in the UK and, particularly, it rises later on in 
the sample period. Also in contrast to the German estimation results, inflation forecast 
uncertainty falls over time, albeit, at a declining rate. The point in time at which the curve 
flattens out and begins to rise appears to lie in the first half of 1996. This is at approximately the 
same time as we found a rise in interbank rate uncertainty in the UK. For the UK therefore, there 
does appear to be some association between increasing uncertainty about future interest rates 
and increasing uncertainty about the future path of inflation, from the mid-1990’s. We return to 
this, and a possible explanation, below. 
  How does the notion of transparency relate to the diverse changes in the dispersion of 
inflation forecasts in both countries? We discussed before the two way effect between money 
market rate uncertainty and inflation uncertainty: a predictable monetary policy will reduce 
interest rate volatility which itself reduces inflation volatility and, inflation volatility determines 
market uncertainty through the CB reaction function. In the previous section we found already 
that Bank of England transparency does not seem to have led to a greater unanimity of money 
market forecasts than is apparent in the Bundesbank/ECB policy regime. So, the remaining issue 
is whether changes in inflation volatility may have caused changes in money market uncertainty.    18 
The second part of this section is concerned with testing for the effect of inflation 
uncertainty on market rate uncertainty.  For both countries, we only replace the trends in the 
regression equations by volatility of inflation and the dependent variables are the one-year-
ahead interest rate forecast dispersions. Table 6 below presents the results. 
 
Table 6: Annual forecasting range and standard deviation of the money market rates and 
inflation volatility for Germany and the UK  
Variable 
i a   i b   1 c  
2 R  
[
2 R ] 
LM(2) 








































Note: All equations are estimated by OLS and the t-values in brackets are calculated on the basis of 
Newy-West adjusted variances and covariances. LM(2) is the Lagrange multiplier test for serial 
correlation of order 2.  In square brackets are the probability levels ‘*’ indicate that coefficients are 
significant at the 5% level of less. The coefficient  1 c  refers to the variable inflation forecast volatility. 
 
There is no evidence for Germany that one-year-ahead euro-DM uncertainty is affected by 
dispersion of views about inflation. This result is perhaps not that surprising. Policy rates are set 
by the ECB and the relevant inflation rate for ECB policy purposes is based on the Harmonised 
Index of Consumer Prices for the euro area.
15 In other words, we may be looking look at the 
‘wrong’ inflation rate. However, when we estimated over the shorter period, before EMU, the 
range of inflation forecasts was not a significant explanatory variable for interest rate forecast 
dispersion. We therefore may conclude that the rise in money market uncertainty may be due to 
the regime change and with it agents’ difficulty to confidently forecast ECB policy.  
For the UK, the results are clear: inflation uncertainty increases the uncertainty of one-
year-ahead forecasts of interest rates. In other words, the rise in inflation uncertainty (see Table 
4) increases monetary policy uncertainty. The interesting question is why should this uncertainty 
have surfaced in 1996. One year later and one might have pointed to the independence of the 
                                                
15 Consensus Forecasts has published euro area statistics only since January 2003.   19 
Bank of England and a partially new operating regime, but this came generally as a surprise and 
so it is difficult to argue that the uncertainty reflects an expectation of a regime change. 
Some evidence is provided in the Bank of England’s Inflation Reports for 1996. In each 
quarterly issue, section 6 discusses ‘prospects for inflation’. This discussion centres around the 
famous fan charts showing the forecast path of inflation as a probability distribution. It is clear 
from a comparison of the charts from one issue to the next that the ‘fan’ becomes more 
dispersed. This increase in the uncertainty of its own forecasts is acknowledged by the Bank in 
the November Report (Bank, 1996b p.44).  Moreover, beginning in February 1996, section 6 of 
the Report included a subsection titled ‘other inflation projections’ wherein the Bank 
commented on other forecasters’ projections, both as regards their median values and the 
dispersion. In the August issue the Bank comments  ‘Unusually, the spread of views for 1997Q4 
has not narrowed…the interquartile range has widened slightly to 2.5%-3.3%’ (Bank, 1996a, 
p.46). The term ‘unusually’ is used because the Bank is referring specifically to the behaviour of 
one year ahead forecasts; the increased dispersion of view is absent at shorter horizons. 
In so far as an explanation is offered, it centres on the behaviour of the exchange rate, 
which had become very volatile, appreciating by 8 per cent between the August and November 
Reports alone (Bank, 1996b pp. 41, 45). It is interesting to note that the standard deviation of 
monthly data for the sterling effective exchange rate between the introduction of inflation 
targeting in November 1992 and the middle of 1996 is just 1.8; from late 1996 to the end of 
2000, a period of roughly comparable length, the standard deviation is 8.05.
16  It is hard to 
escape the conclusion that agents had become familiar with the Bank’s post-inflation targeting 
reaction function and its coefficients, and had become reasonably confident in handling the 
feedback from interest rate decisions to the inflation and output inputs, all in a period of relative 
exchange rate stability. This ends quite suddenly in 1996. From then on, it becomes much more 
difficult to forecast the future path of inflation, at least at horizons like a year or more, and thus 
of the Bank’s likely reaction at similar horizons. Such uncertainty may or may not have been 
supplemented by the reforms in May 1997, but it was already well-established by then. 
 
5. Conclusion  
An increase in monetary policy transparency should reduce the degree of policy ‘surprise’ at the 
short end of the yield curve. Since November 1992 the Bank of England has introduced a 
succession of reforms aimed at increasing transparency. Our tests suggest that UK money 
                                                
16 Calculated from the series XUMABK on the Bank of England’s database.   20 
market agents have, on average, found it much easier to anticipate Bank of England policy 
moves since 1992. 
We also measured the degree of monetary policy surprise for Germany under the 
Bundesbank and ECB regimes. Generally, agents have found it, on average, at least as easy to 
predict policy rate moves under both compared to the Bank of England regime, notwithstanding 
the fact that the Bundesbank was always a rather secretive institution and that the ECB has also 
been criticised at least for a lack of clarity. Furthermore, there is no discernible difference in 
average anticipation due to the regime change from Bundesbank to ECB. 
This result, that two central banks with different transparency characteristics and 
reputations can both conduct efficient monetary policy, does not support the view that 
institutional reforms alone reduce average policy surprises. However, transparency should have 
additional benefits which cannot be detected from this type of analysis. Transparency should 
help markets to become more certain in their forecasts of future interest rates. Our cross 
sectional analysis showed for both countries that short-horizon forecast dispersion has fallen 
over time. Initially, in both countries, diversity of long horizon forecasts has also fallen, but then 
picked up in both countries at a later period. If transparency were an important factor in 
determining market rate uncertainty, we would have expected that interest rate uncertainty were 
falling consistently over time and more under the Bank of England than under the 
Bundesbank/ECB regime. Our results show, by contrast, that market interest rate uncertainty 
behaves similarly over time under both regimes. Again, this suggests that something other than 
institutional characteristics is at work. 
One possible candidate is inflation uncertainty which could affect the spread of market 
rate forecasts through the central bank’s reaction function. If so, a reduction in the dispersion of 
macroeconomic forecasts may be an additional explanation to transparency for any reduction in 
market rate forecast spreads and vice versa. The estimations show that there is clear evidence 
that inflation uncertainty has risen in Germany. We tested for the effect of inflation uncertainty 
on interest rate uncertainty, but we could not conclude that the rise in inflation uncertainty was 
responsible for the rise in long-horizon market rate dispersion. For the UK the results are more 
complex. Initially, inflation uncertainty falls in the UK, but this trend is reversed later on in the 
sample period. We find strong evidence that diversity of inflation forecasts explains market 
interest rate uncertainty in the UK. This may be one of the reasons for why long-horizon market 
rate forecast dispersion has risen and is similar at the end of the sample period under both 
regimes. 
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